Taking a broader view of things: towards a transdisciplinary approach to cancer by Rauch, Cyril et al.
Taking a broader view of things:  
towards a transdisciplinary approach to cancer
Cyril Rauch,a Sarah Blott, a Simon Stewart b
a School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington Campus, Sutton Bonington, Leicestershire, UK
b School of Social, Historical and Literary Studies, University of Portsmouth, UK 
Corresponding author: Simon Stewart simon.stewart@port.ac.uk
Abstract 
Cancer is widely considered an abnormality that emerges from within the body and which must be destroyed and defeated. 
But we still do not know precisely how and why cancer starts, and while a ‘magic bullet’ cure has failed to materialise, those 
adopting a more pragmatic stance are increasingly arguing that if we cannot eradicate all cancer cells, we should look instead 
towards a ‘stalemate’ and find ways of managing cancer as a chronic disease. This article seeks to extend the reach of research in 
this field by taking a broader view and working towards a transdisciplinary approach in order to better understand cancer. First, 
we draw attention to obstacles that hinder progress in formulating new perspectives on cancer. Second, we ask why the genocen-
tric approach to cancer remains dominant. One explanation is the legacy of Cartesian thinking. Third, we consider new ways of 
conceptualizing cancer so that it is not only a scientific object but also an object of life that has a framed existence within the body 
as part of a wider process of biological evolution. We draw on two key examples which highlight the importance of adopting a 
transdisciplinary approach: multi-drug resistance and cancer genomics. 
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1. Introduction
Over the past century, much cancer research has been 
justified by the hope of eradicating cancer through the 
means of finding a magic bullet cure. However, while 
cancer has become a highly competitive research field 
that brings together the brightest minds and is well 
funded, very little has been achieved so far in terms 
of eradication. Moreover, many cutting-edge cancer 
scientists argue that containment (and management) 
and not eradication is a more feasible strategy. Fur-
thermore, early detection (via accurate imaging or bi-
omarker discovery) followed by surgery remains the 
most expedient way to limit the development of can-
cer. By way of comparison, it took only a few decades 
to contain AIDS using drugs via a good understanding 
of the viral disease whereas after almost a century of 
research, cancer is still not properly controlled. 
While each day specific kinases or genes are identi-
fied as being potential ‘causes’ of cancer, we are still far 
from understanding the disease completely. In order to 
make further gains in understanding, we make the case 
for a transdisciplinary approach. What might this entail? 
Steinmetz’s (2007) work provides some useful clues. He 
argues that whereas interdisciplinarity is a condition in 
which disciplines retain their distinct borders and iden-
tities, transdisciplinarity provides ‘a situation in which 
the borders of disciplines are eroded and new inter-
mediate spaces or fields emerge’ (Steinmetz, 2007: 55). 
While academic expertise is constrained by the logic of 
fields and their institutionally-enforced rules (Bourdieu, 
1993) (as is discussed below) insights can nevertheless 
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be gained through encounters with other disciplines in 
intermediate spaces that are created beyond these fields 
and all parties in such relationships can be transformed 
as part of this process (Steinmetz, 2007). 
Steinmetz (2007: 58) argues that in many instances, 
the barriers to transdisciplinarity are self-imposed or 
the result of hysteresis in the disciplinary habitus which 
leads scholars to adopt modes of practices that accord 
with earlier conditions of the field (Steinmetz, 2007: 58). 
However, he urges sociologists to ‘shed long-standing 
disciplinary prejudices about topics like science, the 
humanities, theory, and the ideographic versus the 
nomographic, and to enter into open-ended and deter-
ritorialised encounters with various intellectual others’ 
(Steinmetz, 2007: 58). 
Steinmetz’s call for transdisciplinarity is primarily 
aimed at sociologists but here we utilise its insights to 
facilitate our research project: the authors of this arti-
cle include a sociologist, a geneticist and a physicist/
applied mathematician. Inspired by Steinmetz, this ar-
ticle seeks to pave the way for a transdisciplinary space 
where it is possible to bring together insights from a 
number of disciplines. In order to do so, we draw at-
tention to field-specific obstacles that hinder progress 
in formulating new perspectives on cancer. Second, we 
ask why the genocentric approach to cancer remains 
dominant. One explanation put forward is the legacy 
of Cartesian thinking, which separates the scientist (or 
analyst) from the object of analysis as well as the cell 
from the organism. 
Third, in drawing on a range of perspectives and in-
sights, we consider new ways of conceptualizing cancer 
so that it is not only a scientific object but also an object 
of life that has a framed existence within the body as 
part of a wider process of biological evolution. 
In arguing for a transdisciplinary approach to can-
cer, we draw on two key examples which highlight the 
importance of adopting this approach: multi-drug re-
sistance and cancer genomics.
2. Questioning cancer research 
Questioning cancer research does not mean under-
mining the hard work that has been done but high-
lighting potentially new therapeutic strategies. Nor 
does it mean that that we should cease to gain knowl-
edge, through close empirical observation, in order to 
better understand how chemicals acting on tumours 
impact on them mechanistically. However, trying to 
understand cancer differently, i.e. defining it both as a 
scientific and social object, will put us in a strong-
er position to create new options regarding its treat-
ment. There is significant entanglement between the 
evolution of scientific research on cancer (e.g. the dis-
covery of faulty intracellular pathways or genes), and 
how scientists think about cancer, in part due to the 
way stakeholders (such as national research councils 
or charities) fund research, including their overriding 
aim to foster ‘innovation’ or ‘innovative thinking’ and 
thus engender competition among research institutions 
who seek to strengthen their position in various league 
tables. For these reasons it becomes difficult to revisit 
past ideas about cancer, engage with a range of disci-
plines, or consider epistemological issues in relation to 
obvious scientific paradoxes (such as multi drug resist-
ance – see below). There is a sense, then, that in ‘playing 
the game’, the intellectual curiosity that might lead to 
genuine innovation is blocked and instead, researchers 
are compelled to ‘innovate’ within the pre-determined 
frameworks set in place by various funding bodies. 
Undoubtedly, advances in molecular biology and the 
genomic analysis of cancer have produced an incredi-
ble volume of data, but if research goals are restricted 
to those that accord with current technologies or the 
mainstream concepts of the day, that which has been 
done or thought before is often cast aside and so new 
insights gained through research may remain restricted 
in scope. For example, how can scientists be sure that 
they are able to deliver new concepts or break dogma 
with funding lasting between 3 to 5 years if the grant 
is deemed successful merely because it has managed 
to muster the approval of all the gatekeepers? Peer 
review processes in research provide a vital means of 
quality control and also, more significantly, of refining 
and nurturing, through feedback, new ideas and in-
novations. But research funding application processes 
often restrict innovation by encouraging researchers to 
anticipate what the gatekeepers are expecting. Further-
more, they are incredibly time consuming and writing 
applications takes up precious research time. For exam-
ple, a recent study on the time spent preparing grant 
proposals in Australia estimated that preparing a new 
proposal took an average of 34 days per proposal (Her-
bert et al., 2013). The total estimated cost of the 3727 ap-
plications received by the National Health and Medical 
Research Council was estimated to be in the region of 
$66 million Australian dollars and 550 working years 
of researchers’ time while the success rate for this par-
ticular call was 21 per cent (Herbert et al., 2013). These 
figures did not include the costs in time and money for 
Taking a broader view of things: towards a transdisciplinary approach to cancer 51
the peer reviewers. Aside from the time spent apply-
ing for funding, in addressing all the requirements of 
a funding call, researchers are often directed towards 
formally rational modes of action: their presentation 
of ideas follows a calculable, instrumental logic rath-
er than one inspired by intellectual curiosity (Weber, 
1968[1922]); they become cogs in the machine of univer-
sity income generation. This procedural logic obstructs 
the kind of sustained curiosity that might, admittedly, 
lead to a research ‘dead end’ but which might, in more 
favourable circumstances – with dedication to vocation 
and serendipity – lead to genuine innovation. Such in-
novation might at best be intimated within the formally 
rational confines of a funding proposal, where the pro-
ject’s scope needs to be defined instrumentally in ad-
vance of conducting the research. In the field of science, 
the best proposals do not necessarily equate to the best 
ideas and the stakes here are very high: the type of re-
search that gets done has an indirect role in mitigating 
(or not) the enormous death toll related to cancer (one 
out of eight deaths worldwide); yet very few argue this 
point apart from perhaps medics who, on a daily basis, 
witness the limitations of new drugs/’magic bullets’/
innovations. The pharmaceutical industry’s approach, 
which is predominantly rooted in a ‘market logic’ and 
preferring the ‘business case’, is restricted in its abili-
ty to innovate or think with a broader view, because 
of the constant pressure to promote a high and quick 
return on investment (to top different league tables 
e.g. FTSE). The ‘logic of profit’ leaves little incentive to 
launch new research programmes that draw on insights 
from a range of disciplines but which do not offer an 
immediate return on investment. The biotech model 
is predicated on the expectation of significant returns 
from cancer drugs (Macilwain, 2015). 
The field of science itself also presents numerous 
constraints to innovation. Scientists are, according 
to Bourdieu (2004), the scientific field ‘made flesh’: 
through their training and experience they come to 
embody the presuppositions and state of play of the 
field. Through the training that presupposes entry to 
the field, they gain ‘a practical sense of the problems 
to be dealt with’ and ‘the appropriate ways of dealing 
with them’ (Bourdieu, 2004: 38). They also come to 
learn, implicitly, what is the ‘right way to do science’. 
This leads to orthodoxies in the various sub-fields of 
scientific research, and these orthodoxies are defend-
ed by those occupying dominant positions in the field. 
Their dominance, which is threatened by the pres-
ence of newcomers who seek to impose an alternative 
(or heterodox) vision of science, is nevertheless enabled 
by possession of scientific capital, which is ‘a particular 
kind of symbolic capital, a capital based in knowledge 
and recognition. It is a power which functions as a form 
of credit, presupposing the trust or belief of those who 
undergo it because they are disposed (by their training 
and the very fact of their belonging to the field) to give 
credit, belief)’ (Bourdieu, 2004: 34). In cancer research, 
then, it is no surprise that there is a degree of ‘group 
think’ around the ways in which science should deal 
with the problem of cancer. As Gatenby (2012) points 
out, this is currently manifested in the belief that cancer 
is a disease of the genes, and there is a doxic belief that 
the generation of huge data sets and ever finer-grained 
molecular analysis will somehow lead to a solution for 
the problem of cancer. However, ‘in the absence of a 
true understanding of cancer’s evolution and ecology, 
we have failed to recognise the limits of these data’ 
(Gatenby, 2012: S55). It seems increasingly unrealis-
tic to be able to eradicate the heterogeneous, adaptive 
populations that are found in most cancers. As Gatenby 
(2009: 509) points out, ‘[o]ne centimeter cubed of cancer 
contains about 109 transformed cells and weighs about 
1 gram, which means there are more cancer cells in 10 
grams of tumour than there are people on Earth’. Hence 
the disappointment: the genocentric approach to cancer 
provides another instance of the limits of our ability to 
master reality through calculation and technical pro-
cedure (Weber, 1946[1918]). Cancer has become one of 
the mythologies (in Barthes’s (1973) sense of the term) 
of our time. Drawing on ideological discourses of war 
and triumph, whether from real life (i.e. ‘the war on ter-
ror’) or from fictional, cinematic representations, cancer 
is considered an abnormality that emerges from within 
the body and which must be destroyed and defeated. 
But while a ‘magic bullet’ cure has failed to materialise, 
those adopting a more pragmatic stance are increasing-
ly arguing that if we cannot eradicate all cancer cells, 
we should look instead to look towards a ‘stalemate’ 
and find ways of managing and living with cancer as a 
chronic disease (Gatenby, 2009), thus seeking to ‘box-
in the tumour cells with a discrete, focused strategy of 
containment’ (Oronsky et at., 2015: 1). Many oncologists 
are coming round to the idea that therapeutic strategies 
that seek to control cancer might be more effective than 
those that seek to cure it, especially given that high 
doses of chemotherapy might often lead to tumours 
becoming unresponsive to further treatments (Gaten-
by, 2009). Moreover, the genocentric perspective on 
cancer has been challenged directly by those seeking to 
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construct an alternative paradigm that proposes a the-
ory of organisms and holds that that cancer is a tis-
sue-based disease (Sonnenschein and Soto, 2016). Sonn-
enschein and Soto’s (2016) argument thus counters the 
dominant somatic mutation theory (SMT) which holds 
that cancer is a cell-based disease.  According to SMT, 
molecular changes in the founder cell render it unable 
to control its proliferation, thus leading to the forma-
tion of a tumour. This model assumes that cells are qui-
escent. In contrast, the tissue organization field theory 
(TOFT) promulgated by Sonnenschein and Soto (2016: 
70) argues that the default state of all cells is ‘prolifer-
ation with variation and motility’.  They point out that 
the search to identify the cancer cell is futile because 
both cancer cells and normal cells ‘share the same fun-
damental behavioural properties, namely, proliferation 
and motility’ (Sonnenschein and Soto, 2011: 4334). While 
some genetic differences exist between normal and can-
cer cells, the vast amounts of data concerning the ge-
nomes of thousands of cancers has yet failed to demon-
strate any qualitative difference between pre-metastatic 
and metastatic neoplastic cell. They argue, therefore, 
that ‘the search for identification of a cancer cell should 
be abandoned’ (Sonnenschein and Soto, 2011: 4334). 
In another model, it is argued that it is the disruption 
of local tissue signals that enables cancer formation as 
cells ‘transiently develop a self-defined fitness function’ 
and are thus governed by their own heritable proper-
ties (Gatenby and Brown, 2017). Chemical treatments 
such as proton pump inhibitors and pH-buffers have 
opened up possibilities for alleviating the side effects of 
cancer and inhibiting the growth of tumours (Spugnini 
et al., 2015; Fais et al., 2014; Harguindey et al., 2013). 
Other approaches have drawn on insights from social 
theory, philosophy and physical/mathematical biology 
in order to understand cancer in its evolutionary con-
text, as a living entity perceived as anomalous rather 
than abnormal (Stewart and Rauch, 2016). What these 
perspectives have in common is not only a question-
ing of the orthodoxy in cancer research but more gen-
erally they gesture towards the limits of scientific and 
medical thinking especially in the case of cancer. It is 
our contention that Gatenby’s pragmatic stance and re-
search by the likes of Sonnenschein and Soto provides 
a welcome contrast to orthodox perspectives on cancer 
precisely because their organicist approaches enable 
us to understand cancer as part of a wider process of 
biological evolution. As Bourdieu observes, activity in 
every social field is characterised by struggle between 
heterodoxy and orthodoxy (Bourdieu, 1993), and it is 
time to explore some of the positions occupied by those 
challenging the dominant assumptions of the field 
(Bourdieu, 1993). But in doing so, we also draw atten-
tion to the limits of the dominant frameworks of science 
and medicine today.
3. Limits of knowledge acquisition in science, 
reductionism and determinism
Knowledge acquisition operates through a number 
of well characterised principles that are inherent to 
what science is at a given time, often based on the social 
expectations and related constraints applied to science. 
These principles include, for example: (a) formulating a 
hypothesis including designing an experiment and 
drawing inference from previous work/data; (b) selec-
tion of ‘significant’ data (statistically this is known as 
the p-value) and the clearing of those that are deemed 
not significant; (c) distinguishing and separating data, 
to associate or identify groups of data; (d) providing a 
hierarchical organisation of data (from the most impor-
tant/significant data to the least); and (e) centralising 
these data as a function of theories present at a particu-
lar time. These anthropological operations have been 
applied, in different ways, across various scientific dis-
ciplines. The notion of truth is relative to the set of rep-
resentations used in a given society, i.e. the set of be-
liefs. Moreover, as Kuhn famously pointed out, science 
does not evolve through a linear accumulation of facts 
of knowledge and so the notion of ‘scientific progress’ 
is undermined by the fact that most scientific discover-
ies occur as a result of a break with the ‘normal science’ 
of the day (Kuhn, 2012[1962]). As a result, in order to 
make sense of scientific theories, we need to understand 
how a society is organised, its system of beliefs and rep-
resentations at a given time. For example, the notion of 
‘energy conservation’ in physics did not come from the 
magical or spontaneous mathematical spatial integra-
tion of a force but from the birth of economic rationali-
zation and the related social transformations and in-
dustrial revolutions that occurred between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Terms like ‘force’, 
‘work’ or ‘power’ invented then and used in physics and 
elsewhere have their origins in that social transformation 
that we term ‘modernity’. However these very physical 
concepts that have served us so well for a time neverthe-
less contain their own limits that are visible today under 
the name of ‘black matter’, namely an elusive substance 
that is required in order for our understanding of the 
universe to be compatible with current scientific theory. 
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The entanglement of science and society raises signifi-
cant questions with regard to objects of nature and what 
should be considered as ‘science’. For example, when 
the American Medical Association classified obesity as a 
disease (in 2013), obesity was thus defined as something 
to be ‘cured’. Missing from such diagnoses are the un-
derpinning socio-economic conditions of poverty or so-
cial inequality that might exacerbate this phenomenon. 
Along similar lines, in 2008, soon after Gordon Brown 
(then leader of the Labour Party in the UK) decided to 
revoke the retirement age allowing elderly to work 
longer, the prestigious medical research council of UK 
decided to include aging as a research priority area.  Ag-
ing is a natural process of life on which biological evolu-
tion relies, but it in this instance, it was also defined as 
an object of scientific research because of political and 
economic imperatives. We need to consider, then, the 
biological reality of the ageing body alongside the social 
construction of age as a category and the ways in which 
the latter serves political and economic interests. Thus 
the extent to which an object of nature (e.g. disease, 
planet and so on) is truly a scientific object has to be re-
vealed with a clear understanding of the wider society 
including its system of representations. It is therefore 
not a surprise that in our modern society the terms 
‘health condition’ and ‘disease’ are interchangeable 
even if the former refers more to a social context and the 
latter to a biological context. We can see from these ex-
amples that science and society are inseparable, and so 
sociological analysis of science is necessary in order to 
unpick the relationship. Constructivist approaches such 
as those deployed by Latour and Woolgar (1986) have 
highlighted the linguistic, political and rhetorical devis-
es deployed by scientists in their presentation of ‘facts’. 
Other significant research has examined the construc-
tion of the ‘medical gaze’ (Foucault, 1973), the sociology 
of diagnosis (Brown, 1990; Jutel, 2009) and the role of 
experts and the formulation of an ‘expert gaze’ that me-
diates diagnosis (Gross, 2009). Science is no single thing, 
and various divergent ideological representations of sci-
ence have been deployed by scientists over the centuries 
in order to make claims for the value of scientific re-
search, whether for the purposes of expansion of 
science’s authority into other domains, the monopoliza-
tion of resources or for the sake of guarding the autono-
my of practitioners (Gieryn, 1983). Reflecting on these 
processes, researchers have thus drawn attention to the 
boundary work that is involved in demarcating science 
from non-science (Gieryn, 1983). Boundary work is de-
fined as ‘the constitution of an “independent and 
self-contained field of knowledge” as the basis upon 
which professions can build their authority and exclu-
sivity; and the labour of division which goes into erect-
ing and maintaining boundaries between the profes-
sions and various other groups’ (Fournier, 2000: 69). 
When applied to science, this notion of a labour of divi-
sion is more appropriate than the Durkheimian division 
of labour because it highlights the considerable work 
that goes into the construction, maintenance and polic-
ing of the boundaries between disciplines so that they 
appear to be natural and part of the order of things 
(Fournier, 2000). It is our contention that the links be-
tween science and society need to be questioned by sci-
entists themselves and that, to some extent, scientists, 
within the bounds of their field, are relatively discon-
nected not only from wider society but also from their 
object of study. This disjunction and the related ab-
stracted epistemological position assumed by scientists 
in the western world can be traced back to Descartes’ 
cogito est, i.e. since the seventeenth century, whereby 
the ‘thinker’ (ego cogitans) and its object of study (res ex-
tensa) are disconnected as part of the process of divid-
ing into many pieces any complex natural system (Des-
cartes, 1998[1637]). This paradigm has enabled 
significant developments in science but nevertheless 
impedes the reflexivity that is necessary in order for sci-
entists to consider their object of study and also to re-
flect on the suppositions that they bring to their re-
search. While scientists detach themselves from their 
object of study, they might fail to consider the presup-
positions that they bring to the field. Probing the scien-
tists’ own presuppositions thus consists of ‘objectifying 
the subject of objectification’ and thus dispossessing 
these subjects (the scientists) of the privileges they grant 
themselves (Bourdieu, 2000). The position we occupy in 
the scientific field, or more broadly in the social world 
defines in great part the presuppositions we hold in re-
lation to the very same phenomena. Our training in a 
given field provides us with the competences necessary 
in order to succeed in that field. However, the knowl-
edge and skills that we acquire in order to ‘put on the 
blinkers’ also sometimes restrict us from seeing the lim-
its of our epistemological position and bringing to the 
fore the tacit assumptions we make. For example, while 
cancer biologists might believe that the immortalised 
cancer cell lines that they keep in their incubators are 
truly representative of cancer, a cancer patient would 
probably think differently. The aforementioned dis-
junction and atomisation do not allow a clear synthesis 
of what cancer is. It is therefore not surprising that in 
this context subjective ‘norms’ are defined: for cancer 
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science this means that experimental/scientific meas-
ures between the pieces of the jigsaw are formulated 
and mathematisation is used; these procedures follow 
Descartes in dividing difficulties by examining them in 
as many parts as possible, but in doing so, they remove 
the unity, diversity or identity of natural objects (Des-
cartes, 1998). This reductionism, by removing the object 
from its environment, e.g. the cell from the organism, 
significantly reduces the possibility of understanding 
its essence or the very reason for its existence. 
Classifying cancer, diabetes or aging as diseases (or 
similarly health conditions) or scientific objects throws 
them into the process of disjunction and renders it dif-
ficult to re-synthesise or consider them in relation to 
the organisms or societies from which they originate. 
Furthermore, as knowledge is viewed and treated as 
information, this process is exacerbated. A prevalent 
idea is that if we invest to a greater extent in molecular 
technology, and if we sequence entire cancer popula-
tions cell by cell, we will surely solve the problem of 
cancer. However, unless we consider the cell within the 
organism, or even as part of a wider process of evolu-
tion, this total belief in information can only take us so 
far. It convinces us that we simply need to utilise more 
technology and accumulate facts in order to arrive at 
solutions. As Georg Simmel (2004[1900]) pointed out, 
an intellectualised approach to knowledge has much 
in common with the attitude conveyed by the money 
economy: both knowledge and money are abstracted 
forms that reduce the qualitative expressions of life 
to their quantitative or formally measurable aspects. 
They come to represent the highest forms of abstrac-
tion, and just as money can buy anything (including, 
we mistakenly believe, happiness), so information sys-
tems are seen to be able to solve every problem we en-
counter, even if, of course, this is not the case. Paradox-
ically, this sense of certainty co-exists with increasing 
sense of uncertainty surrounding the risks associated 
with information, science and technology (Beck, 1992; 
Giddens, 1990). Today, Descartes’ (1998: 16) vision for 
science of gaining certainty by casting aside ‘the shift-
ing earth and sand in order to find rock or clay’ seems 
increasingly far-fetched. Anthony Giddens (1990: 39), 
reflecting on Popper’s assertion that science is built on 
shifting sands, argues that in science, ‘nothing is certain, 
and nothing can be proved, even if scientific endeav-
or provides us with the most dependable information 
about the world to which we can aspire’. In addition, 
the reductionism and disjunction of complex systems 
imposed with view to reconstructing them it at a later 
time through the lens of determinism (i.e. mathemati-
sation) has significant limitations, as we will see below. 
The deterministic notion of ‘time’ in scientific research 
is often skewed towards the past and future only, and 
fails to consider the dynamics of the present. This hin-
ders our ability to consider the possibility of new per-
spectives or representations that we might be able to 
envisage in the intermediate spaces enabled by trans-
disciplinary enquiry. 
Let us consider the limits of determinism. Once a 
natural object is deemed reducible, scientists take steps 
to atomise the object. A tumour can be atomised into 
cells, a cell into organelles, an organelle into molecules, 
and molecules into atoms. Whether or not a theory of 
cancer is true, it will rely on rebuilding, step by step, 
how these elements interact in (often) artificial environ-
ments. The experimental testing will therefore be based 
on a form of determinism that uses the notion of causal-
ity. The local link that exists between elementary bricks 
will be experimentally tested through the production 
of a cause and the measure of its effect; and the differ-
ence between the cause and its effect will be measured 
through the time difference between those events. Un-
surprisingly, all mathematical equations aiming at mod-
elling a system whatever its complexity will use ‘differ-
ential equations’ whereby time does not exist in full but 
forms an appendix to measure causal relations. Within 
the very writing of those equations there is a tendency 
to overlook the present and to consider only past-to-
future relations. The mathematisation or experimental 
testing of any theory is radically skewed as it is based 
on anticipation and expectation, and so overlooks the 
possibilities inherent in the present. The extent to which 
reductionism (locality) and determinism (causality) al-
low us to understand a broader system is questionable 
and this is highlighted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who 
points out that ‘[le temps] nait de mon rapport avec les 
choses…Ce qui est passé ou futur pour moi est présent 
dans le monde’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). The notion of 
the ‘succession of events’ commonly known as ‘time’ 
is needed because the world has been atomised by sci-
entific thinking and the disjunctions that are created in 
order to verify hypotheses. Furthermore, this view on 
time frames the superiority of the thinker or scientist 
that is reflected in her or his ability to control nature. It 
means being in a position of controlling time through 
experimental testing. Here, the wider scope of evolu-
tionary time, with its dynamic potential and move-
ment, is overlooked and so we propose that it is time to 
turn our attention towards this evolutionary moment, 
by means of a transdisciplinary approach.
Taking a broader view of things: towards a transdisciplinary approach to cancer 55
4. Multi drug resistance in cancer
To support this point of view regarding the con-
ceptual limits of determinism within a narrow tempo-
ral frame, let us consider an empirical example: ‘multi 
drug resistance’ (MDR). This example utilises insights 
from different disciplinary perspectives. Multi drug 
resistance in cancer is a phenomenon that is observed 
in patients following a number of years of chemother-
apy. It occurs when a tumour becomes resistant to the 
chemotherapy and a relapse is observed. It is intriguing 
to observe that once a tumour (or cancer cells) becomes 
resistant to one type of chemotherapy, it also becomes 
resistant to many other different chemotherapies to 
which the tumour has never been exposed - hence the 
notion of multi drug resistance. Initially, the assump-
tion was made that a molecular event would be able 
to ‘vacuum clean’ (or efflux) chemotherapy drugs from 
cancer cells (Dano, 1973). This hypothesis clearly took 
off when P-glycoprotein (Pgp) was identified as the 
membrane protein over-expressed in multi drug resist-
ant cancer cells that actively extruded chemotherapy 
drugs (Juliano and Ling, 1976). However, there was 
an inherent problem linked to the concept of molecu-
lar ‘specificity’. This refers to where cause-effect rela-
tionships arise from molecular affinity and, for exam-
ple, two biological molecules interact as a function of 
their biochemical affinity. Defined this way, affinity 
corresponds to the energy exchanged when molecules 
are bound to each other; a very high affinity is defined 
as specificity. It follows naturally that an efficient bio-
chemical reaction relies on high affinity between bio-
chemicals. Note that ‘efficiency’ is also defined as the 
time lapse for the biochemical reaction to occur, mean-
ing that high affinity reactions will occur over a short 
period of time. The logic that emerges from this view is 
also known as the ‘key-lock’ model whereby there is a 
need to match molecules chemically with one another. 
In this context, efficiency (i.e. the speed of the reaction) 
and affinity are equivalent. However, the key-lock mod-
el is problematic when one molecule becomes promis-
cuous and interacts with many different partners with 
similar efficacies, which is exactly what is observed and 
experimentally measured in MDR. In this context two 
scenarios are possible: either the promiscuous molecule 
is very large and has many interaction points to connect 
its partners, or the key-lock model has limitations and 
so efficiency and specificity/affinity are not necessari-
ly equivalent. In multi drug resistance, therefore, the 
problem that needed to be resolved was this: how can 
low affinity reactions also be efficient? The incoherence 
of the ‘key-lock’ model in multi drug resistance was 
noted by Paul Roepe (2000):
MDR cells are resistant to, and/or exhibit decreased 
retention of, literally hundreds of different 
hydrophobic compounds that are structurally 
divergent (…). Membrane transporters, like soluble 
enzymes, are exquisitely substrate-specific … 
If transporters were not specific, the cell would 
eventually become a high entropy chaotic mess … 
[as there are] no structural molecular motifs common 
to all the many different agents to which MDR 
cells are resistant. (…) MDR protein [Pgp] is a very 
unusual enzyme with extraordinarily broad substrate 
recognition capabilities; that is, it violates the law of 
enzyme specificity. 
indeed,
controversy remains over how P-gp recognizes 
hundreds of different hydrophobic drugs and pumps 
them out of the cell…’ (Gottesman et al., 2009). 
Our understanding of multi drug resistance is limit-
ed if it is only the temporal (i.e. efficiency/affinity) and 
never the spatial dimensions of biochemical interaction 
that are considered. The reason for this can be found 
in how biochemists initiated their field of research 
known today as ‘enzymology’. In the early 18th Centu-
ry, to demonstrate the presence of reactions, it became 
necessary to extract and purify enzymes to measure 
biochemical reactions in an aqueous medium in glass 
vases. This meant that the notion of ‘reaction’ was nec-
essarily temporal given the removal of the enzyme 
from its initial site in the body. This procedure, how-
ever, lost the crucial information regarding the spatial 
presence of the enzyme in the body. This is why today 
all kinetic equations that measure on a temporal scale 
the enzymes’ reactivity refer only to concentrations of 
enzymes in glass vases. This is far too simplistic. Given 
that any biochemical reaction relies on biochemical col-
lisions to occur, it is possible to demonstrate that if two 
biochemicals are in a confined space, the likelihood of a 
reaction (i.e. efficiency) can be high even if the affinity 
between biochemicals is low. This explains the diver-
gence between affinity and efficiency and underscores 
the possibility of molecular promiscuity. Pgp is not 
enough to explain multi drug resistance and so spatial 
restriction/confinement together with Pgp must be con-
sidered (figure 1). 
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In recent years, it was demonstrated that it is the 
membrane that provides a confined space for high ef-
ficiency reactions to occur between a drug and Pgp 
whatever their affinity (Daniel et al., 2013). This exam-
ple shows that the empirical testing of a theory needs to 
situate temporality within a spatial dimension in order 
to gain a stronger understanding of some of the para-
doxes – such as MDR – that we encounter in scientific 
research where biochemical reactions do not follow an 
expected, deterministic or predictable pattern. Drawing 
on insights from physics, we see that chemical affini-
ty can now be extended to incorporate a new ‘physi-
cal affinity’ that depends on spatial properties. In other 
words, the nature and properties of space need to be 
considered in biochemistry/biology. 
5. Cancer genomics
Let us consider a second example – cancer genom-
ics – where we can also gain new insights by combin-
ing disciplinary perspectives to arrive at understand-
ing that embraces complexity and extends beyond the 
sum of its parts. Developments in molecular techniques 
have greatly advanced the study and understanding of 
cancer.  However, a deterministic approach is usually 
taken with separate studies addressing the genomics 
(DNA), epigenomics, transcriptomics (RNA) and pro-
teomics (protein) aspects of cancer biology.  Each com-
ponent of the genetic and cellular machinery is thus 
‘atomised’ as a separate entity and studied in isolation. 
Cancer genome sequencing has enabled the discovery 
of somatic (non-inherited) ‘driver’ changes in the DNA, 
which in the presence of causative or predisposing en-
vironmental factors lead to the initiation of cancer and 
confer a selective growth advantage to tumour cells. It is 
also the case that changes in the germline DNA (inher-
ited) have been shown to stimulate tumour growth via 
different mechanisms (Carter et al., 2017). The current-
ly accepted model of carcinogenesis is of early ‘driver’ 
mutations occurring in a small number of cells, and 
these mutations provide a selective growth advantage 
to normal cells allowing them to proliferate (Vogel-
stein et al., 2013). However, we still do not know how 
and why cancer starts in these cells, while at the same 
time, genomic instability and the process of genomic 
change are accelerated. The developing tumour con-
sists of clonal colonies of cells, which continue to accrue 
genomic changes (giving rise to genetic heterogeneity) 
and which are subject to selection through the tumour 
microenvironment.  The importance of tumour genetic 
heterogeneity has been recognised, and is an intense fo-
cus of study (Waclaw, et al., 2015). Heterogeneity is one 
of the main reasons for treatment failure, particularly 
for tumours that have metastasised.  It has also led to the 
recognition that every patient has an individual genetic 
profile and treatment needs to be personalised. Popula-
tion and evolutionary genetic methods have been used 
to analyse heterogeneity and reconstruct tumour evo-
lution. However, since the outcome of evolution cannot 
be known in advance, predicting future outcomes still 
remains a difficult task. Alongside the genomic studies, 
epigenome studies, RNA sequencing (transcriptomics) 
and protein analysis (proteomics) have explored how 
the DNA message is translated into functional effects 
within the cell (Dawson 2017; Modelska et al. 2015). 
However, these studies are rarely performed together 
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Figure 1. Representation of drug resistance in different cancer 
cells, i.e. in (A) breast derived cancer and (B) leukemic cells. Both 
cells were treated with anticancer agents (doxorubicin an anthra-
cycline derivate) that are visible under specific conditions using 
adequate fluorescence techniques. Non-resistant cells accumulate 
high levels of doxorubicin whereas drug resistant cells accumu-
late less. This process can be reversed by changing the membrane 
(what we called ‘confinement’ in the text) with the possibility of 
either reversing or increasing drug resistance. (C) This is a rep-
resentation of chemical vs. physical affinities. From a biochemical 
point of view, a reaction is only possible if two chemicals have af-
finity towards one another. However in a situation where the two 
chemicals are impeded in their opportunity to meet and react, the 
experimentalist will assume that the affinity is low. Alternatively, 
if two chemicals are encouraged to meet, even with low affinity, 
a reaction will occur. For an experimentalist, it may seem that the 
two chemicals have high chemical affinity whereas they have, in 
reality, very little affinity.
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meaning that there is no integrated analysis emerging 
from the separate disciplines. In spite of the large vol-
ume of work which exists, several important questions 
remain unanswered. It is still unknown how the seeds 
of cancer are germinated within a normal tissue, or how 
tumour cells can migrate and metastasise, i.e. how the 
physical/spatial environment is involved.  Answering 
these questions needs application of a perspective that 
transgresses boundaries in order to arrive at new con-
clusions. For example, consideration of the three-di-
mensional structure of tumours and spatial constraints 
shows early promise in developing models which ex-
plain tumour growth and chemotherapy resistance 
(Waclaw, et al., 2015). Moreover, radically new ideas on 
the way cells self-select in response to environmental 
stress, through sampling of their genomic information 
(Almassalha et al., 2016), give clues to the way in which 
cancer is seeded.
6. Thinking the unthinkable: cancer and 
evolution.
A transdisciplinary approach might take us even 
further in our bid to understand cancer. Cancer arises 
as a result of multiple factors, both environmental and 
genetic. However, in some instances, cancer is not an 
anarchic piece of tissue that has outgrown the limit of 
our body. It contains several layers of cells of differ-
ent thicknesses that are organised in what looks like 
a well-defined and functional piece of tissue that can 
survive a hostile environment (figure 2). As evolution 
is, by definition, one of the most important hallmarks 
of biology as it allows life to be propelled forward, one 
could wonder whether cancer is not simply the result 
of biological evolution. In this context, while cancer 
might be thought of as a disease for scientists or a 
health condition for society, it may also be a natural 
and normal object of life. Evolution has a unique as-
pect in that it embraces contingency. Cause-effect and 
time (as understood only in relation to past-future re-
lations) are meaningless in relation to evolution. This 
is because evolution cannot be understood in advance 
but only retrospectively and so we can consider that 
evolution is history in action. As a result, the link that 
exists between the past and the future discussed above 
is broken.
Cancer cannot be thought about in advance but 
needs to be simply contemplated in the present, in a 
manner analogous to a piece of art that resonates with 
our thoughts and triggers sensations that provide us 
with a proof of our own existence. Of course, with so 
many negative connotations, cancer is frightening as it 
reconnects us with nature: it demonstrates to us that 
the disjunction between human existence and nature 
(or the cell and the organism) is not a real one. It is, 
rather, the result of our own consciousness: ‘je pense, 
j’existe’, so Descartes thought. In this context Des-
cartes’ cogito, and related scientific theory or methods, 
is limited in its ability to conceptualise cancer.1 As a 
result, it is important to change the current representa-
tions of cancer but to do so we need to try to think the 
unthinkable. While this may sound an impossible task, 
it is important to contemplate what biology and in par-
ticular evolution has to offer. There is a tendency to 
think about evolution often from the top, i.e. the ex-
tremity of the branches of an evolutionary tree. How-
ever, if we trace the opposite journey from the trunk to 
the branch, the trunk had to give rise to a bud. The bud 
may or may not have survived evolution and a branch 
from the bud may or may not have arisen to be fossil-
ised. In any case the bud is the novelty, the thing that 
did not exist before and was thus devoid of representa-
tion. In other words, the bud is a monster, a novelty. 
1  In this article, there is not room to engage to a greater extent with 
the richness of Descartes’ work. We merely draw attention to one 
key aspect of his legacy in scientific practice.
Figure 2. Section of equids testis with teratocarcinoma showing 
enamel (teeth) formation. This demonstrates how heterogeneous new 
tissues can develop in parallel with cancer. Teratocarcinoma can be 
found in every organ not only germinal organs (ovary or testis). 
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Thus if one thinks about the evolutionary tree from the 
trunk to the branches and if one believes in evolution, 
then by definition of evolution, the monster is a neces-
sary entity. But there is more: a monster shows itself but 
cannot be spoken of because it appears for the first time 
and, consequently, is not yet recognised. The monster 
is a species that has yet to acquire a name and so it can-
not yet be represented or thought about. In this context 
one could think of cancer as a sort of monstrous bud 
whose birth is on the tree of evolution, a kind of living 
piece of art invoking the present and challenging our 
perception of time. To get to grips with this complexity, 
we need to embrace intellectual transculturation and be 
‘open to freer interactions with outside knowledge for-
mations’ (Steinmetz, 2007: 52). We might therefore learn 
as much from perspectives in art or cinema as from Big 
Data because the above-mentioned monster cannot be 
spoken about or represented. As a consequence, Des-
cartes’ cogito might be replaced by: ‘je pense, j’existe, 
mais qui suis-je vraiment?’
7.Conclusion: towards a transdisciplinary 
approach to cancer
Cancer is far more than a primary or continuous 
cancer cell line, but, regrettably, few bridges exist con-
necting science and other ways of thinking about can-
cer. A scientist might think about ‘innovation’ based on 
his/her cancer cells, but in doing so can lose sight of the 
fundamental fact that cells belong to organisms where 
they are constrained by cell to cell interactions as part of 
the whole organism. In contrast, the oncologist thinks 
about patients. The scientist and the oncologist are dis-
connected from one another, and both have different 
connections with society as a whole. Sociological anal-
ysis is perhaps best placed to account for the reasons 
behind the great faith that persists, among many cancer 
biologists, in a genocentric approach. Meanwhile, in the 
case of MDR in cancer, we have demonstrated that an 
understanding of temporal biochemical reactions can 
only take us so far if we neglect the spatial dimensions 
that are revealed to us by means of physical biology. 
These transdisciplinary insights extend beyond the 
sum of knowledge produced by each individual dis-
cipline. But transdisciplinary research is never going 
to be straightforward: it is likely to be disjunctive and 
messy if we are aware of the complexity and hetero-
geneity of knowledge production and also ‘its hybrid 
nature, non-linearity, and reflexivity, transcending any 
academic disciplinary structure’ (Lawrence, 2010: 127). 
Transdisciplinary approaches, if they are to be success-
ful, rely on reflexivity, introspection, communication, 
collaboration and trust. This is especially important 
because the findings conveyed to us by colleagues in 
other disciplines might not be interpreted with the 
same clarity with which we perceive our own. Whilst 
in the case of interdisciplinarity we can return back to 
the fold of our disciplines having collaborated within 
zones of common interest, with transdisciplinarity, we 
have the opportunity to inhabit new spaces of intellec-
tual collaboration where there are new rules and the 
disciplinary borders are fluid. The power relations in 
these new intermediate spaces are by no means utopian 
or egalitarian (why would they be?) and there is no ob-
vious lingua franca. The problem remains, as for Weber 
(1946[1918]), that it is often difficult if not impossible to 
find bridges between the different value spheres of life. 
However, there is nevertheless an opportunity to create 
new forms of knowledge and greater insights into prob-
lems than could be produced by individual disciplines. 
Together, in a ‘nonimperial encounter’ in an intermedi-
ate space, as Steinmetz (2007) suggests, broader, more 
encompassing perspectives can be forged. Such are 
the challenges and rewards associated with adopting a 
transdisciplinary approach. If we take the example of 
cancer, we can wonder whether a single cell line in a 
dish is really representative of what cancer is all about. 
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